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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 16, Number 3, 1977-1978

Banishing Fear From the Skies: A Statutory
Proposal*
Robert A. Friedlander**
INTRODUCTION

On November 3, 1977, for the third time within a decade, the
United Nations General Asembly condemned by consensus the unlawful interference with air transport, and called upon all states to
take whatever steps they believed necessary to combat the global
threat of aerial hijacking.' The main tenor of the General Assembly's Resolution was to urge the adoption by every state of the three
international agreements which attempt to regulate criminal acts
interfering with civil aviation,' while at the same time the Resolution rejected any resort to the unilateral type of rescue action carried
out first at Entebbe during July, 1976, and then at Larnaca in
February, 1978.
The United Nations originally went on record in December, 1969
urging national legislation prohibiting and penalizing the illegal
seizure of aircraft, and also supporting efforts of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) toward drafting an international convention. 3 The following year, in November, 1970, the
* Presented in slightly different form and under another title to the International Studies
Association Mid-West Conference, DeKalb, Illinois, May 5, 1978.
** Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law; Member, Committee on International Terrorism, World Association of Lawyers; Ph.D., Northwestern University (1963); J.D., DePaul University (1973). The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. E. Barry Greenberg, J.D., Lewis University (1978), in the preparation of this
Statute.
1. Safety of International Civil Aviation, G.A. Res. 32/8 (XXXII), 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
-- , U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/8 (1977).
2. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
3. Forcible Diversion of Civil Aircraft in Flight, G.A. Res. 2551 (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR,
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General Assembly once again denounced all interference with civil
air travel, but in addition urged states: (1) to extradite or prosecute
(according to the recognized maxim of aut dedere aut punire) all
hijacking perpetrators it had apprehended; (2) to accede to the one
existing Convention, signed in 1963, criminalizing offenses committed on board civilian aircraft and additionally to support another
anti-hijacking Convention which was negotiated that year; (3) to
take joint and separate action in concert with ICAO and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; (4) to
make special efforts for securing the safe return of any hijacked
aircraft along with its crew, passengers, and cargo.4
As of 1977, all three international Conventions proscribing the
interference with air transport had entered into force. Yet, barely
half of the world community subscribes to either one or all of these
agreements, and their total impact has been less than inhibiting.
Thus far, eighty-eight nations have ratified the Tokyo Convention
of 1963, seventy-nine states have ratified the Hague Convention of
1970, and only seventy-five countries have adhered to the Montreal
Convention of 1971. 5 Given the statistics on aircraft hijacking alone
since the year 1967, this global indifference is astonishing to say the
least. There have been 527 various acts of hijacking or attempted
hijacking worldwide during the decade 1967-1977, with the number
of incidents of last year (32) almost double that of the preceding
twelve months (18). Between 1961 and 1978, there have been 190
individual hijackings of United States registered aircraft, and new
incidents occurring in the first three months of 1978 indicate that
the level of aviation criminality is not receding.'
None of the three existing hijacking Conventions has actually
come to grips with the real challenge involved-namely, the questions of punishment and sanctions.7 One expert has identified five
Supp. (No. 105), U.N. Doc. A/7845 (1969).
4. Aerial Hijacking or Interference with Civil Air Travel, G.A. Res. 2645 (XXV), 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 99), U.N. Doc. A/8176 (1970).
5. See New York Times, Nov. 4, 1977, at A-3, col. 1.
6. These statistics are taken from the current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
update of its reports relating to civil aviation security, March 17, 1978 [hereinafter cited as
FAA Report]. I am indebted to Mr. V.L. Krohn, Chief, Operations Liaison Staff, Civil
Aviation Security Service, for providing me with these figures. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) recorded 392 attempts since 1969 (not including the December,
1977, hijacking of an Eastern Airlines plane to Atlanta), 201 being rated successful. Chicago
Tribune, Dec. 11, 1977, § 1, at 5, col. 3.
7. See E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRcRAFr AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-
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different typologies of motivations for air hijackers: asylum, felonius
escape, mental defect, criminal extortion, and ideological or political terrorism.' The earliest aerial hijackings occurred in 1947 and
1948. They were occasioned by politically motivated actors of Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Czech nationality, who sought to flee
political oppression? During the early years of Cold War era, these
fugitives found a sympathetic reception in their host countries. The
highwater mark of international tolerance for asylum-oriented seizures of civil air transport came in an April, 1952, decision by the
Swiss Federal Tribunal. Given the repressive nature of the Yugoslavian regime, the Swiss Court held that escape by whatever means
from government constraint was "worthy of asylum," and that,
therefore, the political motivation for the act in question outweighed
the criminality of such offense." Contrast this with the attitude of
the West German courts which treated two separate hijacking incidents involving Czech nationals seeking to obtain political asylum
as a criminal act, necessitating a term of imprisonment. Nevertheless, the West German government also refused to comply with
Czechoslovakia's extradition request and indicated that asylum
would be granted the defendants upon completion of their prison
term, thus satisfying the requirements of the aut dedere aut punire
principle."
Escape for political reasons may be sought from any country. Two
incidents of criminal extortion involving United States' aircraft
have been interpreted by the Algerian government and by French
courts as being politically motivated, and consequently the United
States requests for extradition in both these cases were denied.,'
Mentally disturbed hijackers, however, have uniformly been subjected to stiff penalties, 13 and the United States-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and
Other Offenses of February 15, 1973, was aimed as much at those
17 (1975) [hereinafter cited as McWHINNEY]; Rosenfield, Air Piracy: Is It Time to Relax Our
Security?, 9 NEW ENG. L. REV. 81, 98-102 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfield].
8. Rosenfield, supra note 7, at 88-90.
9. FAA Report, supra note 6.
10. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. 371, 373-74 (1952).
11. FAA Report, supra note 6. See also Phoenix Gazette, Mar. 31, 1977, at A-4, col. 3;
Washington Star, Oct. 12, 1977, at A-12, col. 1.
12. See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1975,
at 168-75 (1976); E. McDoWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
1976, at 124-25 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE, 1976].
13. See generally D. HUBBARD, THE SKYJACKER: His FUGHTS OF FANCY (1971).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 283

individuals as at political offenders.' 4 Despite Prime Minister Castro's denunciation of that agreement on October 15, 1976,1 the
United States-Cuban prohibition against the illegal seizure of aircraft, and Castro's harsh treatment of such offenders," has totally
eliminated skyjacking between the two countries. For the most part,
pure criminality in the skies is treated as such by all civilized nations.' 7
It remains one of the great curiosities of contemporary international law that although there is still no legally accepted definition
of international terrorism, aerial hijacking is considered per se to be
an act of terror-violence." One authority has even termed hijacking a peremptory norm.' 9 And therein lies the rub. Although the
offense' of interference with air transport is widely held to be an
essential part of international criminal law, the offending actors are
subject to the prevailing rules of extradition, which can be negatived
by a political offense exception. 0 Many states, the United States
and Canada among them, recognize treaties as the sole source of
extradition law."' Canada has executed only three treaties with
other countries-Austria, Sweden, and the United States-which
make the unlawful seizure of aircraft an extraditable offense. 2
Therefore, it can well be said that the central problem posed by the
interference with air transport is, basically, one of conflict or lack
of jurisdiction.2
14. 24 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7579 (1973). An identical pact was signed the same day
between Canada and Cuba.
15. DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE, 1976, supra note 12, at 400.
16. Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 1978, § 1, at 42, col. 1.
17. FAA Report, supra note 6.
18. See the various analyses put forward in 1 A TRATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (M.
Bassiouni ed. 1975); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES (Y. Alexander ed. 1976); TERRORISM: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Y. Alexander ed. 1977); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY (D. Carlton & C. Schaerf eds.
1975); MCWHINNEY, supra note 7; D. JOYNER, AERIAL HIJACKING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
(1974).
19. Whiteman, "Jus Cogens" in InternationalLaw, with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 609, 625 (1977). Political terrorism is mentioned separately, which is a definite
minority view, and terrorism is also listed as jus cogens, again a minority view.
20. See M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 370-400
(1974) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI]; G. LA FOREST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA 6182 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LA FOREST].
21. BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 24-26; LA FOREST, supra note 20, at 17-18, 34.
22. LA FOREST, supra note 20, at 34. The legal basis for extradition practice among all
civilized nations is formulated either by treaty, comity, or reciprocity.
23. S. SHUBBER, JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES ON BOARD AIRCRAFT 1 (1973).
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There is also no doubt that state responsibility, as evidenced in
the Entebbe and Larnaca episodes, is likewise of critical significance if commercial air travel is to continue operating on the principle of innocent safe passage. A recent, well-argued, and richly detailed study has clearly demonstrated that international norms establishing state responsibility for terroristic acts, including the interference with civil aviation and seizure of nonmilitary aircraft,
already exist, and that an international due process can be effectively implemented.2 4 The American and Canadian governments as
early as 1973 proposed suspension of all commercial air service to
countries providing safe havens to hijackers.2 5 In 1974, the United
States Congress passed an Anti-Hijacking Act which authorized the
President to suspend air service to countries providing safe havens
to hijackers." The United States Senate passed a similar resolution
in 1976,7 and the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act s which is now under
29
consideration by that same body contains stringent proposals.
However, the Carter Administration has consistently shied away
from any tough-minded approach to the international skyjacking
menace.
In truth, politics as usual prevails not only in the United States,
but also in the United Nations. Truly effective preventive and punitive measures have not been achieved because domestic political
considerations have taken priority over international needs. This
has not been more dramatically demonstrated than in October of
last year. Not until the threat of a global strike by the International
Federation of Airline Pilots Association (IFALPA) did the United
Nations finally act to condemn by resolution (November 1-3, 1977)
the most recent hostage-style seizures of commercial air transport.3
The Deputy President of IFALPA was not impressed by the United
24. Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977). See also Kutner, Constructive Notice: A Proposal
to End InternationalTerrorism, 19 N.Y.L.F. 325 (1973).
25. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 68 at 1, 3 (Jan. 1973); Bell, The U.S. Response
to Terrorism Against Civil Aviation, 19 O~as 1326, 1337 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bell].
26. Bell, supra note 25, at 1339.
27. S. Res. 524, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S11611 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1976).
28. S. Res. 2234, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S17706 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977). I
am indebted to Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff for providing me with a copy of the Act.
29. On March 16, 1978, four other prominent United States Senators proposed still another anti-terrorist resolution. Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1978, at A-21, col. 6.
30. See New York Times, Nov. 2, 1977, at A-8, col. 2; id., Nov. 4, 1977, at A-3, col. 1; 14
U.N. Chronicle 13-15 (Nov. 1977); id. at 23-26 (Dec. 1977).
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Nations' qualified reaction, indicating that he would have preferred
'3
a declaration "with more punch." 1
Jurisdiction remains the key to the skyjacking dilemma, but without a willingness to exercise the proper jurisdictional authority,
terror-violence will continue to menace the skies. The model statute
which follows below is designed to clarify jurisdictional issues, to
provide precise and workable guidelines in support of the principle
of aut dedere aut punire, to specify the nature and substance of
criminal offenses relating to the interference with air transport, to
identify clearly the elements of said illegal activities, and to devise
acceptable means for the safety of aircraft, passengers, and crew in
the event of an attempted or successful seizure.
The -grim, and hopefully unacceptable alternative, is the use of
counterforce as a first response whereby "nations which are serious
about ending terrorism . . . act unilaterally in Operation Entebbetype strikes rather than to rely on the goodwill of the world community."3 2 But in order to achieve the international rule of law, one
must first develop a viable international legal system. The words of
President James Earl Carter delivered to the thirty-second session
of the United Nations General Assembly serve as both a warning
and a call to action:
Violence, terrorism, assassination, undeclared wars all
threaten to destroy the restraint and the moderation that must
become the dominant characteristic of our age. Unless we establish a code of international behavior in which the resort to
violence becomes increasingly irrelevant to the pursuit of national interests, we will crush the world's dreams for human
development and full flowering of human freedom. 3
THE STATUTORY PROPOSAL

Table of Contents
Section 1. Preamble
Section 2. Elements of the Offense
31. New York Times, Nov. 4, 1977, at A-3, col. 1.
32. Alexander & Levine, Preparefor the Next Entebbe, 25 Cturr's L.J. 240 (1977).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 547 (Oct. 1977). On what the world community has
attempted to do, see Friedlander, Terrorism and InternationalLaw: What is Being Done?, 8
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 383 (1977).
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2.1 Specific Acts
2.2 Inchoate Acts
2.3 External Acts
2.4 Applicability
2.5 Limitations
Section 3. Sanctions
3.1 Penalties
3.2 Suspension of Trade and Commerce
3.3 Extraditable Offenses
Section 4. Jurisdiction over the Offense
4.1 Affected States
4.2 Jurisdictional Competence
4.3 Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction
4.4 Joint or International Operations
4.5 Custodial Procedures
4.6 Exercise of Jurisdiction
4.7 Extradition Procedures
4.8 Obligations of Contracting States
Section 5. Powers of the Aircraft Commander and Relief from Liability
5.1 Reasonable Grounds or Reasonable Belief
5.2 Obligations of Crew and Assistance of Passengers
5.3 Measures of Restraint
5.4 Notification of Authorities
5.5 Emergency Disembarkation
5.6 Delivery of Suspected Offenders
5.7 Exemption from Civil Liability
Section 6. Statutory Interpretation
6.1 Arbitration
6.2 Reservation
6.3 Denunciation
Section 1: Preamble
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS STATUTE
CONSIDERING that unlawful acts against the safety of civil
aviation jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine the
confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil
aviation;
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CONSIDERING that the occurrence of such acts is a matter
of grave concern;
CONSIDERING that for the purpose of deterring such acts,
there is an urgent need to provide appropriate measures for
punishment of offenders;
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
COMMENTARY

Three major international conventions dealing with the subject of
aircraft hijacking have been signed and have entered into force:
the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, done at Tokyo on September 14, 1963,11 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The
Hague on December 16, 1970,'3 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at
Montreal on September 23, 1971.36

While Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal contain many similar elements, their respective provisions were born of different needs.
Tokyo was intended by its drafters to restore possession and control
of the hijacked aircraft to those lawfully in command. The drafters
of Hague believed that Tokyo was not adequate to meet the needs
of the continued threat of aircraft hijacking posed by the events of
the previous decade. Hague, therefore, attempted to invoke the
established norm: aut dedere aut punire. Montreal expanded
the scope of the two previous Conventions to include sanctions
against perpetrators of sabotage and other offenses committed
not only against the aircraft and its personnel, but also upon air
navigational facilities which likewise served as targets of such misconduct.
Section 2: Elements of the Offense
2.1 Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and intentionally:
34. 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (entered into force on December 4, 1969)
[hereinafter referred to as Tokyo].
35. 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into force on October 14, 1971) [hereinafter
referred to as Hague].
36. 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force on January 26, 1973) [hereinafter
referred to as Montreal].
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(a) performs an act of violence against a person or persons on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to
endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to
such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service,
by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it
which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to
it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(d) communicates information which he knows to be
false or misleading, thereby endangering the safety of an
aircraft in flight.
2.2

Any person also commits an offense if he:

(a) attempts to commit any of the aforesaid offenses in
Section 1; or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit any such offense.
2.3 Any person also commits an offense if he destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation,
if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft
in service, or its passengers, or cargo.
(a) An aircraft is considered to be in flight from the
moment when all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when any such door is
opened for the purpose of disembarkation; or
(b) In the event of a forced landing, the flight shall be
deemed to continue until lawfully authorized personnel
reassume unimpeded control over the aircraft and reassume protection of the persons and property on board said
aircraft.
(c) An aircraft is considered to be in service for a specific
flight from the beginning of the preflight preparation of
the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew until 24
hours after any landing.
(1) This period of service shall extend for the entire
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time during which the aircraft is in flight as defined
in paragraph (a) of Section 2.3 of this Statute.
2.4 This Statute is applicable to any international or domestic flight, if:
(a) the place of take-off or the place of landing, whether
actual or intended, is situated outside the territory of the
State of registration for the hijacked aircraft; or
(b) the offense is committed in the territory of a State
other than the State of registration for the aircraft; or
(c) the offender is found within the territory of a State
other than the State of registration for the aircraft; or
(d) the offense is committed or the offender is found
within the territory of a State other than a State involved
in an international or joint operation under Section 4.4,
but whose places of take-off and landing are in the territory of the same State; or
(e) the air navigation facilities contemplated in Section
4.4 are used in either domestic or international air navigdtion.
2.5 This Statute shall also be effective as against offenders
alleged to have hijacked aircraft used primarily or exclusively
for military, customs, or police services.
COMMENTARY

The major portion of this section is taken from articles 1, 2, and
4 of Montreal. Its scope, however, is substantially expanded, since
it applies to any of the offenses listed above, whether or not the
offender is actually on board the aircraft and whether or not the
offense endangers aircraft which are in flight or which are in service.
Any unlawful exercise of control over the aircraft, its passengers,
its crew, or its cargo, by whatever means, should be considered as a
commission of the offense of aircraft hijacking. Under article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,3 7 treaties are to be
interpreted in a reasonable sense, bearing in mind their objects
and purposes. Montreal not only applies sanctions against perpetra37.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 29 (1969).
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tors of sabotage and other offenses committed upon the aircraft and
its personnel, but also includes attacks upon air navigational facilities. Montreal was in fact specifically designed to deal with unlawful
interference as well as unlawful seizure." A reasonable interpretation of this Statute would include as an offense any such control by
whatever means achieved. Certain forms of harm or threat of harm
to the crew and passengers on board the aircraft may be exercised
by some form of psychological coercion originating from actors not
physically present on said aircraft, for example, actors who are present in the air navigation facility, such as the control tower or the
passenger terminal. Presence in these areas incontrovertibly creates
unlawful interference likely to endanger the safety of any aircraft,
wherever located.
Section 2 likewise includes the acts of an accomplice, whether in
their inchoate or completed form. Here, the haven state or its authorities may be considered as an accomplice or accomplices before
or after the fact, since the intent of the section is to include as
offenders all active or passive participants-whether conspirators,
actors, or accessories. As subjects of international law, states should
be responsible not only for their unlawful commissions but also for
any unlawful omissions. Therefore, state actors as well as individual actors must be held to compliance with the minimum standards
set forth in this section.39
Additionally, offenses are deemed to be committed whether the
air navigation facility is used for domestic or international flights
without regard to the particular acts constituting the offense as
specified in Montreal.
Section 3: Sanctions
3.1 Any signatory State having authority to exercise jurisdiction over the offenses enumerated in Section 2 of this Statute
and which exercises its priority rights as enumerated in Section
4 of this Statute must comply with one of the following measures:
38. See Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
and Interference with Aircraft-PartII: The Montreal Convention, 14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 268 (1975).
39. See Fitzgerald, Concerted Action Against States Found in Default of Their International Obligationsin Respect of Unlawful Interference with InternationalCivil Aviation, 1972
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 261 (1972).
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(a) Where the offender has been prosecuted and convicted of any of the offenses listed above in Section 2, the
prosecuting State shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment or, at its option, capital punishment, in accordance
with its domestic gubstantive and procedural laws.
(b) Where death results, directly or causally from any of
the acts constituting an offense as listed in Section 2, then
the prosecuting State shall impose a capital penalty; but
if the domestic laws of such State prohibit capital punishment, then the appropriate sentence shall be life imprisonment at hard labor with no possibility of parole.
3.2 Where any State refuses either to extradite or prosecute
in good faith, and thereby is in violation of the provisions of
Section 4.5(e) of this Statute, any State whether or not a Party
to this Code, is herein granted, with agreement of the signatories of this Code, legal authority to invoke any or all of the
following measures:
(a) suspension of commercial air service to the offending
State, as well as to any other State engaged in economic
or business transactions of any nature with the offending
State; or
(b) suspension of air rights to the violating State over the
territory or territories of the invoking State, and to any
other State engaged in economic or business transactions
of any nature with the offending State; or
(c) suspension of economic transactions or charitable
operations with an offending State or any other State engaged in trade or commerce with the offending State.
3.3 The offenses enumerated in this Statute shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of avoidance of extradition.
(a) Nothing in this Statute shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State has
substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an offense or offenses listed in Section 2 has
been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a
person on account of his race, religion, nationality, or pol-
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itical opinion; nor shall such person's position be prejudiced for any of these reasons.
COMMENTARY

This sanction section which expands article 3 of Montreal is designed to mandate good faith prosecution and conviction of offenders. States in violation of the provisions enumerated in section 2
may be subject to punitive action by any other state, whether or
not granted competence by this Statute to exercise jurisdiction over
the offending state. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties, 0 specifies that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Article 26 of
that same Convention places the good faith obligation of pacta sunt
servanda upon all treaty signatories. Nevertheless, there are recognized norms of state responsibility in customary international law
that require due diligence to protect persons and property of foreign
nationals from potential or actual harm." Article 25 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago, on December
7, 197711 imposes upon each contracting State the duty to render all
practicable assistance to any aircraft in distress within its own territory and to the owners of said aircraft or authorities of the state in
which the aircraft is registered. It has been argued that the application of sanctions to states is within the exclusive purview of the
Security Council, but the sanctions proposed herein are merely selfexecuting enforcement measures of the established principles of customary international law and may be applied in the same way as
penalties for violations of the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949. State parties to those Conventions were required to enact
legislation which would give their domestic courts jurisdiction to try
offenders.
With respect to penalties, capital punishment is already imposed
in the municipal legislation of Australia, France, Japan, and the
Soviet Union, if the unlawful seizure or interference with an aircraft
results in death or serious bodily harm. Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany provide for a maximum sentence of life imprison40. U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).
41. See Lissitzyn, In-Flight Crime and United States Legislation, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 306
(1973).
42. 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. (entered into force on April 4, 1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1591.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 283

ment in such cases (the sentence being mandatory in the former
-country). United States statutes, as a result of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions, make a violator of the federal hijacking
law subject to imprisonment for 20 years to life, if the offense took
place outside the jurisdiction of the United States, or any term of
years to life if the offense occurs within the United States special
aircraft jurisdiction.4 3
The provision for the elimination of the protection granted to
perpetrators of political crimes is similar to that of the European
Convention on the Supression of Terrorism, done at Strasbourg on
November 10, 1976. 44 The offenses enumerated in sections 2.1, 2.2,
and 2.3 are deemed to be common crimes and shall not provide an
excusing condition for purposes of extradition. Even though a political exception to a request for extradition may still apply when there
is serious reason to believe that this request was made for considerations of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, any taking
of hostages or seizure of property would generally negative this
claim for protection.
Section 4: Jurisdictionover the Offense
4.1 Affected States: Each contracting State shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over
such offenses as in the following cases:
(a) when the offense is committed in the territory of that
State; or
(b) when the offense is committed against or on board an
aircraft registered in that State; or
(c) when the aircraft on board which the offense is committed lands in its territory with the offender on board; or
(d) when the offense is committed against, or on board,
an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who had his
principal place of business, or if none, his permanent residence, in that State.
4.2 Where two or more States are competent to exercise jurisdiction over any of the offenses enumerated in Section 2 of this
43. See Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 641 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Evans].
44. 15 INT'L L. MAT. 1272 (November 1976).
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Statute, the following priorities must be observed in determining which requesting State takes precedence:
(a) first, the State of registration of the hijacked aircraft;
(b) second, the State in which the aircraft was hijacked;
(c) third, the State or States originally designated as
disembarkation points, with the terminal point State taking priority;
(d) fourth, the State in which any offense was committed not on board under Sections 2.1 and 2.3 of this Statute;
(e) fifth, the States in which the hijacked aircraft actually lands, if at variance with Section 4.2(c), in order of
such landings;
(f) sixth, the State in which the offender is apprehended.
4.3 This Statute does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with domestic law.
4.4 Contracting States which establish joint air transport
operating organizations or international operating agencies,
which operate aircraft subject to joint or international registration, shall designate for each aircraft the State which shall
exercise jurisdiction and shall have the attributes of the State
of registration for the purpose of this Statute, and shall give
notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization
which shall communicate the notice to all State Parties subject
to this Statute.
4.5 Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant,
any contracting State in the territory of which the offender is
found, shall take him into custody under the domestic laws of
that State, but only for such period of time as is necessary to
enable any criminal extradition proceedings to be instituted,
with the following procedures to be followed:
(a) The requested State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts surrounding the offense;
(b) Any person in custody pursuant to the provisions of
this Statute shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest representative of the State of which
he is a national;
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(c) The requested State shall immediately notify the
States enumerated in Section 4.1 of this Statute, the State
of nationality of the offender, and any other State it deems
advisable, of the fact that such person is in custody and
of the facts surrounding the offense which warrant his
detention;
(d) The State making the preliminary inquiry under
paragraph (a) above, shall promptly report its findings to
the States enumerated in Section 4.1, and shall indicate
whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction over the offender.
(e) The contracting State in the territory of which the
offender is found shall be obliged without exception whatsoever, and whether or not the offense was committed
within its territory, either to extradite the offender to one
of the States competent to exercise jurisdiction over the
offender, or otherwise to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of good faith prosecution, punishable under Section 3.1 of this Statute.
4.6 If, however, an aircraft is hijacked which qualifies as one
discussed in Section 2.3(a) of this Statute, then the State designated as competent to exercise jurisdiction therefrom, shall
have precedence for purposes of extradition and prosecution
over those priorities enumerated in Section 3.1(e) of this Statute.
4.7 The offenses described in Section 2 above shall be deemed
to be included as extraditable in any existing extradition treaty
between such States, subject only to the following limitations:
(a) If a contracting State, which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, receives a request for
extradition from another contracting State with which it
has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this
Statute as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the
offense; the extradition under this Section shall be subject
to the other conditions provided by the domestic law of the
requested States; or
(b) Contracting States which do not make extradition
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the
offenses enumerated in Section 2 as extraditable offenses
between themselves, and such extradition shall be mandatory if the custodial State does not prosecute in accord-
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ance with Section 4.5 of this Statute; and
(c) Each of the offenses enumerated in Section 2 shall be
treated as if it had been committed not only in the place
in which it in fact occurred, but also in the territories of
the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Section 4.1 of this Statute.
4.8 A contracting State shall take all practicable measures in
accordance with both municipal and international law to prevent the offenses enumerated in Section 2 above.
(a) When any flight has been delayed or interrupted due
to the commission of any of the offenses so enumerated,
the contracting State in whose territory the aircraft, its
passengers, or its crew are present, shall facilitate the continuation of the journey of the affected persons, and shall
return the aircraft and its cargo to those lawfully entitled
to its possession, as expediently as is practicable.
(b) Each contracting State shall in accordance with its
municipal law, report to the Council of the International
Civil Aviation Organization as promptly as possible any
relevant information in its possession concerning:
(1) the circumstances of the offense;
(2) the action taken pursuant to Section 4.7(b);
(3) the measures taken in relation to the offender
and the results of any extradition proceedings or
other legal proceedings.
(c) Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offenses enumerated in
Section 2 above; in all cases, the domestic law of the requested State shall apply, and the provisions of this paragraph shall not affect obligations under any treaty governing mutual assistance in criminal matters.
(d) Any contracting State, having reason to believe that
one of the offenses listed in Section 2 above will be committed, or is about to be committed, shall immediatey
furnish any relevant information in its possession to those
States which it believes will be subject to the commission
of such offenses.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 283

COMMENTARY

Section 4 of this Statute largely relies upon articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, and 12 of Montreal. This section not only lists those states
competent to exercise jurisdiction over the offender, but also under
section 4.2 determines the priority of states that wish to exercise
jurisdiction. No system of establishing such priorities can be found
under any of the existing Conventions. This section serves notice
upon all states adhering to this Statute as to which priorities shall
be followed in the exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, costly time spent
upon negotiations as to which state has the better right is eliminated, while the right of every state to enforce its own penal law is
preserved.
Under this Statute, aerial hijacking and the interference with
air transport facilities becomes delicta juris gentium affecting the
interests of the entire international community. Perpetrators of the
prophibited acts contained in section 2 become, as with pirates and
piracy, hostis humani generis, and jurisdiction over such offenders
is established even though the act itself may have occurred beyond
the prosecuting state's boundaries. However, the priorities themselves are obligatory, and the duty to extradite or prosecute remains
binding upon the signatories. The thrust of both Hague and Montreal was directed toward prosecution of the offender rather than
upon the question of extradition. This Statute completes their initial steps. When section 4.4 becomes operative, the International
Civil Aviation Organization is granted the competence to establish general guidelines, since that specialized international agency
has dealt with the problems of air transportation from its formation
in 1947.
Section 4 further mandates that a requested state shall apply the
principle of aut dedere aut punire in good faith. It solves the problem raised by one authority of what happens when a hijacker of an
aircraft registered in State A forces that aircraft to land and refuel
in State B, then lands in State C, and escapes to State D where he
is finally apprehended." It is conceded that certain problems will
still arise such as the demand by State A, a political adversary of
State B, for a suspected offender with national, racial, or religious
ties to the requested state. The sanction provisions found in section
3.2 will serve to obviate the political risks otherwise involved.
45.

See Evans, supra notc 43, at 723-24.
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Section 4.8 refines the language of the Chicago Convention," particularly articles 25 and 37, which place an obligation upon state
parties to render all possible measures of assistance to an aircraft
in distress, in order to facilitate onward carriage to its ultimate
destination and to aid in the return of said aircraft to its lawful
owners.
Section 5: Powers of the Aircraft Commander and Relief from
Liability
5.1 The aircraft commander, when he has reasonable grounds
to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit,
on board the aircraft, an offense or act contemplated in Section
2, may impose upon such person reasonable measures including such restraint as is necessary to:
(a) protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or
property therein; or
(b) maintain good order and discipline on board; or
(c) enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disembark him in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
5.2 The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other crew members and may request or authorize,
but not require, the assistance of passengers to restrain any
persons whom he is entitled to restrain.
(a) Any crew member or passenger may also take reasonable measures when he has reasonable grounds to believe
that such action is immediately necessary to protect the
safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein.
(b) Where any person attempts or succeeds in restoring
full possession and control of the aircraft to those lawfully
in command, only that degree of force or restraint may be
invoked which he reasonably believes is necessary to defend himself or another against the use of unlawful force
which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to
himself, to the captain and crew, or to other passengers.
46.

See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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5.3 Measures of restraint imposed upon a person in accordance with Sections 5.1 and 5.2 shall not be continued beyond
any point at which the aircraft lands, unless:
(a) such point is in the territory of a non-contracting
State and its authorities refuse to permit disembarkation
of that person; or
(b) those measures have been imposed in accordance
with Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, in order to enable delivery
of that person to competent authorities; or
(c) that person agrees to onward carriage under restraint.
5.4 The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable, and
if possible, before landing in the territory of a State with a
person on board who has been placed under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, notify
the authorities of such State of the fact that a person on board
is under restraint and of the reasons for such restraint.
5.5 The aircraft commander, insofar as it is necessary for the
purpose of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above, may disembark in the
territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person
who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is
about to commit, on board the aircraft, an act contemplated
in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 above.
(a) The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which he disembarks any person pursuant to Section 5 the facts of and the reasons for such
disembarkation.
5.6 The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent
authorities of any contracting State, in the territory of which
the aircraft lands, any person who he has reasonable grounds
to believe has committed on board the aircraft an act which,
in his reasonable opinion, is a serious offense according to the
penal law of the State of registration of the aircraft.
(a) The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable,
and if possible, before landing in the territory of a contracting State with a person on board whom the aircraft
commander intends to deliver in accordance with the pre-
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ceding paragraph, notify the authorities of such State of
his intention to deliver such person and provide the reasons therefor.
(b) The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities
to whom any suspected offender is delivered in accordance
with the provisions of this Section with evidence and information which, under the law of the State of registration
of said aircraft, are lawfully in the commander's possession.
5.7 Where the safety of any aircraft or air navigation facility
has been placed in jeopardy by any of the offenses enumerated
in Section 2 of this Statute, any of the following acts shall not
be considered as a basis for civil liability:
(a) any inchoate or completed act by any pilot or crew
member which is intended to restore full possession and
control of the aircraft to those lawfully in command; or
(b) any inchoate or completed act by any employee or
agent of an air navigational facility which is intended to
restore full possession and control of such facility to those
in lawful authority; or
(c) any inchoate or completed act by any private person,
in the capacity of passenger or visitor at an air navigational facility or on board an aircraft, where that person
is subjected to any of the acts constituting an offense as
enumerated in Section 2 of this Statute, and thereby engages in any reasonable conduct intended to restore full
possession and control of such aircraft or facility.
COMMENTARY

The major portion of this section relies extensively on articles 6,
7, 8, and 9 of Tokyo. Its purpose is to designate command responsibility over an aircraft in flight in order to insure the maximum
protection of passengers, crew, and property. The aircraft commander is given special authority to apprehend and restrain a suspected or potential offender, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect actor is about to commit, is committing, or
has already committed an offense as described in section 2 of this
Statute. The authority given the aircraft commander to require the

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 283

assistance of the crew or to request assistance from a passenger is
derived from the common law authority of a peace officer's use of
force in making an arrest and from the use of force by a private
person assisting a peace officer or when making a citizen's arrest.47
Section 5.7 enlarges the scope of article 10 of the Tokyo Convention. To protect the aircraft commander's position of authority and
to insure the cooperation and assistance of passengers and crew in
the event of the commission of an offense as defined in section 2 of
this Statute, an exemption from civil liability is granted to those
individuals who act in defense of their person and property and to
protect the aircraft while in flight, or the aircraft facility, as long as
the exempted acts were done reasonably.

Section 6: Statutory Interpretation
6.1 Any dispute between two or more contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute, which
cannot be settled through negotiation, shall be submitted to
arbitration at the request of any such State.
(a) If the State Parties are unable to agree on the measures to implement such arbitration within six months
from the date of request, any State Party may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
6.2 Any State may declare that it does not consider itself
bound by Section 4.1 of this Statute, if such.reservation is
made at the time of signature, ratification, or accession; the
other contracting States are thenceforth not bound by Section
4.1 to such reserving State; any reserving State may withdraw
its reservation by due notification to the depository Governments.
6.3 Any contracting State may denounce this Statute by
written notification to the depository Governments; such denunciation shall take effect three months after such notification is received by the depository Governments.
COMMENTARY

This Statute completes the preliminary steps taken by Tokyo,
47.

See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04-.08 (1962).
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Hague, and Montreal to control the illegal seizure of aircraft and the
interference with air transport. By delineating specific offenses, by
clarifying and expanding jurisdiction over the offender, by setting
forth priorities in extradition claims, and by establishing penalties
applicable to individual offenders as well as providing sanctions
against offending states, the above Statute fulfills the spirit of the
three prior Conventions and the intentions of its drafters. The underlying purpose of this Statute is the establishment of a minimum
standard of world public order, so that an energetic and concerted
control action over any violation of those standards can be properly
and effectively exercised. The right of the world community to innocent air passage under any and all conditions is absolute. It must
be protected by the rule of law.***
*** The above Statute in somewhat different form has been incorporated by'a special
committee of the International Penal Law Association into a Draft International Criminal
Code which will soon be submitted by its Secretary-General, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni,
to the United Nations International Law Commission.

